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Chapter 10
Changes in Accounting Practices Will Drive
Pension Paradigm Shifts
Douglas Fore
The long bull market for equities in the 1990s permitted many firms with
defined benefit (DB) pension funds to dramatically scale back, and in
many cases even eliminate, required annual contributions to these plans.
This occurred because equity allocations in the pension trusts grew so
significantly, as to more than keep pace with growth in plan liabilities. In
short, the stock market did all of their heavy lifting for them. Some firms, in
fact, were able to turn their pension plans into profit centers that contrib-
uted in a nontrivial way to the firms’ quarterly income growth. As we shall
show below, especially in the USA but to some extent in Europe as well, the
accounting rules for pension plan asset allocation featured an odd discon-
nect insofar as risk and return were concerned, which permitted heavy
equity allocations to pension plans.
This phase in pension profitability came to an abrupt end with the
bursting of the stock market bubble and the onset of the bear market in
March 2000. Making matters worse, interest rates then fell sharply, thus
boosting the present value of DB pension liabilities. Erosion in DB plan
funding status was sharp and dramatic. For firms in the S&P 500, approxi-
mately 70 percent of which offered DB plans, these plans were, in aggre-
gate, roughly $300 billion overfunded in 1999, the last full year of the bull
market (Morgan Stanley 2003). By mid-2003, analysts estimated that DB
plans in the S&P 500 were underfunded by $340 billion. Furthermore,
many of the S&P 500 firms have a relatively older workforce, as well as
large numbers of annuitants, and they are rapidly approaching the day
when they will begin paying out large pension cash flows on a sustained
basis. This abrupt shift in DB plan funding status raises the question of
whether pension accounting rules are consistent with the principles of
pension finance.
This volume examines proposed changes in US and international pen-
sion accounting standards and the rationales for such changes. One find-
ing is that convergence is on the way, and this is probably a good thing in
terms of fundamental principles of finance though the journey could be a
bumpy one. Another finding is that convergence will probably change the
way pension investments are managed. Plan sponsors must become more
aware of these changes in the accounting arena and the impact they will
have on pension as well as corporate finance.
Setting the Rules for Pension Accounting
In the USA, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) is the
designated organization in the private sector that determines standards
of financial accounting and reporting. The standards set by FASB are
officially recognized as authoritative by the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC) for all firms listed on US exchanges. Officially, the SEC has
the authority to override FASB and establish standards, but it has been SEC
practice to rely on the private sector for standard setting. One of the
missions of FASB is to keep standards current to reflect changes in the
economic environment, and at any given time a dozen or more projects
may be underway to improve and update standards, of which several may be
on convergence-related topics. For example, the recently released SFAS
132, Employers’ Disclosures about Pensions and Other Postretirement Benefits, was
motivated partly with convergence in mind, partly by an awareness that the
existing pension accounting framework was antiquated, and partly in re-
sponse to concerns expressed by users of financial statements about the
need for more and clearer information.
The parallel private-sector standard-setting body in the UK is the
Accounting Standards Board (ASB). At present, it is leading a movement
to fair value accounting standards, with the intention of serving as a global
model. In FRS 17 Retirement Benefits, the ASB (2000: 6) summed up key
objectives in this area:
. Financial statements should reflect at fair value the assets and liabil-
ities arising from an employer’s retirement benefit obligations and any
related funding.
. The operating costs of providing retirement benefits to employees
should be recognized in the accounting period(s) in which the bene-
fits are earned by the employees, and the related finance costs and any
other changes in value of the assets and liabilities are recognized in the
accounting periods in which they arise.
. The financial statements should contain adequate disclosure of the
cost of providing retirement benefits and the related gains, losses,
assets and liabilities.
The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is an independent,
privately funded standard-setter based in London, whose mission is to
develop a single set of high quality, understandable, and enforceable
global accounting standards. The IASB cooperates with national stand-
ard-setters such as FASB to achieve convergence around the world. As we
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will see, standards for retirement benefits developed by the IASB bear the
influence of ASB, with certain Continental European influences as well.
The standards also show the influence of the new disclosures issues by
FASB.
Pension Accounting in the USA
The main reason that pension accounting rules are so critically important
in the DB context is that these plans have very long time horizons, both
with regard to the accumulation and the payout phases. An employer
sponsoring a DB plan is not only responsible for providing sufficient cash
flows to meet not only this year’s service and interest contributions, but also
he must meet obligations at far distant points in time. Consequently, for
funding purposes, actuarial projections must be made over long time
horizons involving such factors as future mortality experience and assump-
tions regarding asset returns.
From 1986 through 2003, the prevailing US standard for pension
accounting was SFAS 87. This embodied a smoothing methodology to
dampen fluctuations in pension assets and liabilities from one year to the
next. Under SFAS 87, liabilities were essentially treated as fixed-income
instruments and discounted at a specified long-term interest rate. There
were a variety of rules governing permissible actuarial assumptions when
measuring a plan’s accumulated liabilities. It is important to note, however,
that the discount rate used to measure plan liabilities never depended on
the plan’s participant demographic structure. That is to say, the rules
insisted that the proper discount rate was invariant to expected cash flows
actually payable by DB plan sponsors. For example, in the case of an old-
line industrial firm with many workers nearing retirement age, the DB plan
would face the prospect of having to pay out large sums to these workers as
they began to retire in large numbers. Finance experts would have recom-
mended that these plan liabilities should be discounted with a set of
interest rates that matched the timing of required cash flows. But SFAS
87 required a single interest rate unrelated to the place on the yield curve
that a plan sponsor might need to discount benefit payments using finance
methodology.
SFAS 87 also required that the projected unit credit (PUC) method be
used to measure plan liabilities. The PUC takes both present-day benefit
accruals and their likely future values into account, in addition to benefits
earned by vested terminated employees.1 Given the lack of portability in
DB plans, this last can constitute a significant portion of the total obliga-
tion. The accumulated benefit obligation is the present value of benefits
accrued to date, by each vested employee in the plan at the start of each
year. An additional minimum liability must be recognized if the accumu-
lated benefit obligation exceeds the fair value of plan assets. The present
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value of benefits accrued by employees during the course of the year is
referred to as the plan’s service or normal cost. Service cost can be amort-
ized over a period of several years. The present value of the liabilities of the
plan at the beginning of the year multiplied by the plan’s discount rate is
referred to as the interest cost of the plan. The interest cost is the cost of
financing the plan for a year. Future liabilities which long-term employees
in the plan are expected to earn is called the projected benefit obligation
(PBO); this is measured as the actuarial present value of benefits earned by
an employee under the pension benefit formula to a certain date. This is
computed using assumptions about future compensation levels, and it also
takes into consideration the design of the pension benefit formula (i.e.
final-pay, final-average-pay, or career-average-pay plans).
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974,
benefits earned in corporate DB plans in the past may not be changed.
Nevertheless, it is possible to change the formula for future benefits, an
outcome that sometimes produces tension between employees and em-
ployers. This is particularly true with a DB plan that is backloaded in its
benefit formula. Backloading means that a high percentage of the DB
pension value accrues during the last few years of employment.2 The fact
that future benefits can be changed of course implies that the PBO is not
an ironclad measure of total plan liabilities. Instead, the measure will vary
from firm to firm, and it depends on such factors as union agreements,
whether the plan is part of a multi-employer arrangement, the funding
status of the plan, and so on.3
In the summer of 2003, the FASB released an Exposure Draft of State-
ment 132. This was part of a project with the IASB, motivated by widespread
dissatisfaction with US pension accounting. After receiving comments,
FASB moved with unaccustomed speed to issue the final version of SFAS
132 in December 2003. During deliberations, the Board considered but
rejected, requiring additional disclosures that would have enabled users of
financial statements obtain a better understanding of the timing of cash
flows associated with the demographic structure of DB pension plans. Most
importantly, such a requirement would have permitted analysts to assess
whether a plan’s portfolio of assets matched its liabilities in terms of
duration. This information could be helpful in formulating assessments
of a firm’s liability structure and the magnitude of cash flows payable over
time. Duration disclosures could also help those seeking to conduct sensi-
tivity analysis and test key assumptions about the firm’s asset management
strategies and stress-test the firm’s liability immunization strategy. Unfor-
tunately the FASB eventually excluded these requirements from the final
Statement.
Under the previous versions of SFAS 87 and 132 (in effect from 1986–
2003), a single rate of return assumption was used for accounting for plan
assets, and returns were smoothed over a period of years. This had the very
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powerful effect of making actual volatility virtually unrelated to the rate of
return assumption selected by the plan sponsor. Further, during that
period, plan sponsors were not required to disclose volatility assumptions
for asset returns. As a result, the accounting rules embedded a strong pro-
equity bias; some argue that pension assets were managed with such a ‘tilt’
that it appeared as if they had a beta of zero in financial terms (Gold 2001;
Ambachtsheer Chapter 11).
It is our contention that the accounting rules explain why the equity
share in pension portfolios has remained so high for the past several
decades, despite changes that should have encouraged a shift to fixed
income investment to better match changes in the liability structure (par-
ticularly demographic aging). These rules produced a situation where
pension returns were decoupled from pension risks. Anticipated returns
could be booked on the income statement today, but the risks could be
smoothed on the balance sheet over a period of several years. This led some
to raise anticipated return assumptions, boost the share of the portfolio
devoted to equities, and ‘hope for the best.’ This strategy worked as long as
the market continued to defy gravity during the bull market experienced in
the USA over the 1990s. Eventually, however, the bubble burst and analysts
undertook more detailed examinations of balance sheets. At that time, the
smoothing strategy was recognized as problematic and worse: indeed when
the market fell for three straight years post-2000, the smoothing strategy
was revealed to have a built-in negative reinforcement mechanism. DB
plans that appeared comfortably overfunded in 1999 became dramatically
underfunded by 2003, and now they face the prospect of many years of
deficit-reduction contributions.
Several authors have recently characterized the traditional DB account-
ing system as one which encouraged an ‘opaque’ model of asset allocation
(Gold 2001; Coronado and Sharpe 2003). Another way to frame the debate
is to say that during a bull market, users of financial statements tended to
focus more on firm income statements and less on the footnotes. But when
times grow difficult and firms are more likely to be in distress, analysts focus
more heavily on the footnotes and the balance sheet. Coronado and
Sharpe (2003) confirm this hypothesis empirically, finding that users of
financial statements used pension accrual data from income statements
rather than information regarding the market value of the DB plan assets
and liabilities reported in the footnotes. In a related study, Amir and
Benartzi (1997) found that firms raised their fixed-income allocations
between 1988–94 to avoid recognizing additional minimum DB plan liabil-
ities. In addition, they found that plans with high proportions of younger
workers had higher equity weightings in their plan portfolios.
Another surprising fact is that DB plan asset allocation patterns have
been relatively invariant over the last several years, despite repeated and
sometimes violent market shocks. Asset allocations remained quite stable
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despite the market bubble in which standard measures of valuation such as
price to book and price/equity ratios were seen by many as ‘otherworldly’.
And despite the now-extended bear market for equities and strong bull
market in at least some sections of the fixed-income market,
asset allocations still remained quite stable. As a result, DB plan funding
deteriorated dramatically and the duration of their liabilities shortened
as well.
One explanation for the puzzle of the stability of DB plan asset allocation
may be the fact that senior plan sponsors have strong incentives to argue
the case for equities. For instance, a chief financial officer (CFO) who
reduced his plan’s equity weighing would likely have to boost plan contri-
butions indefinitely. This CFO would have to report to the chief executive
officer (CEO) and Board that not only would next quarter’s earnings
would be reduced, but also earnings over more reporting horizons than
the length of the CFO’s contract. Perhaps a CFO with great credibility
could escape with his stock price intact, but most would anticipate a
negative market reaction. This reality discourages the incentive to reduce
equity allocations despite changing circumstances.
Instead of requiring disclosure of the expected rate of return by individ-
ual asset category, the revised SFAS 132 requires only a narrative descrip-
tion of the investment strategies employed by the DB plans. FASB now
requires only an explanation of the basis used to determine the overall
expected rate of return on assets, but it did not specify which significant
factors should be included when determining the long-term rate of return
on assets assumption. The Board did say, however, that the disclosure
should explain the general approach taken, which historical data were
used in forming the long-term rate of return assumption, and information
on factors as whether adjustments were made to historical data. As a result,
assumptions can still vary from one plan sponsor to the next.
Pension Accounting in the United Kingdom
The UK moved to the forefront of the fair value accounting movement in
2000, when the UK Accounting Standards Board issued Financial Report-
ing Standard (FRS) 17. In a nutshell, fair value approach to accounting
represents a conscious effort to move away from smoothing techniques,
toward the use of market prices to value assets and liabilities.
The evolution of FRS 17 indicated an important shift within the UK
actuarial community regarding the proper way to measure DB plan assets
and liabilities. Initially, actuaries and the ASB were opposed to fair valu-
ation of plan assets, preferring instead the more traditional actuarial
valuation approach. By the end of the decade, however, it appeared clear
that the actuarial approach to assets valuation would be viewed as weak
both inside Europe and outside, and would probably not be adopted by
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other standard-setters. As a result, they moved to DB plan market valuation,
and in so doing, they went a step farther than did the USA with SFAS 87.
For instance, under the US approach, plan asset values can still be
smoothed over a period of up to five years. In the UK, under FRS 17,
gains and losses must be immediately recognized.
The ASB also indicated a strong preference for market valuation of DB
plan liabilities. In some ways, this debate mirrors the discussion concerning
the accounting treatment of long-dated insurance liabilities which con-
tinues to cause controversy between the IASB and life insurance firms
around the world.4 Acknowledging the lack of an active market in long
pension liabilities, the ASB considered alternative actuarial methods for
discounting plan liabilities. Ultimately, it determined that under the pro-
spective benefit method the total cost that accrues, including interest, is
spread evenly over the time of service of an employee. The ASB argued that
this did not represent economic reality where the cost of providing a DB
pension increased as an employee approached the retirement date.
The old Statement of Standard Accounting Practice 24 (SSAP 24) per-
mitted plan sponsors to discount liabilities at the same rate as the expected
return on DB plan assets. This produced biased incentive effects, leading
firms to raise the rate of return assumptions and the discount rate at the
same time. Aware of this problem, the ASB in its deliberations considered a
variety of approaches for setting the discount rate for plan liabilities. One
issue was whether the DB annuity payment was fixed in nominal terms, or
adjusted for inflation., and the Board realized that, in many cases, inflation-
adjustment of DB annuities had participating elements. In other works,
annuitants sometimes shared in the investment performance of the
DB plan’s assets, and in other cases they shared in temporary mis-
matches of the plan’s asset-liability mix. The Board considered whether
index-linked bonds were the best instruments to discount the liabilities,
index-linked government bonds having been in use in the UK for far
longer than in the USA. In addition, the ASB considered whether a dis-
count rate that reflected the returns of a weighted portfolio consisting of
both equities and fixed-income investments would be preferable for DB
plans that based benefits on final salary accrual patterns. In SSAP 24, plan
sponsors had considerable discretion with regard to the choice of actuarial
and other assumptions, and one of the principal changes in the switch to
FRS 17 was the reduction in the degree of discretion allowed.
All this discussion took place against the backdrop of research in pension
finance, which was focused on the question of what instrument might offer
the best long-term match against wage growth. Final salary plans, in par-
ticular, link benefits to pay levels, so many plan sponsors have felt that
equity investment was a decent hedge against the benefit promise in such
formulas. Plans which continue payments for the length of retirees’ lives
(as opposed to contracting out the annuities to an insurer) also must be
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aware that the time horizon for choosing a security or securities to match
liabilities is not the worker’s retirement date but rather the retirees’ life
expectancy.5 Looked at in this way, the question of portfolio choice for
expected cash flows soon proves to be far more complicated than com-
monly thought. Nevertheless, the ASB ultimately decided to simplify and
adopt a single discount rate, the rate on AA corporate bonds, for discount-
ing plan liabilities. In coming to this conclusion, it explicitly noted that
part of the rationale for this decision was to bring about convergence in
standards.
One criticism of fair value accounting for pensions is that it introduces
excessive volatility into financial statements for little or no apparent bene-
fit. Another is that it makes accounting regulations drive economic and
financial decision-making. In rebuttal, the Board argued that recognizing
year-to-year fluctuations in asset values in the financial statements was
similar to recognizing revaluation gains and losses on fixed assets. It stated
(ASB 2000: 71):
The Board regards actuarial gains and losses as similar in nature to revaluation gains
and losses on fixed assets. In relation to the assets in the pension scheme, they are
held with a view to producing a relatively secure long-term return that will assist in
financing the pension cost. The length of the term, coupled with the options
available to the employer to restrict the liability in extreme circumstances, mean
that much of the fluctuations in market values does not affect the relatively stable
cash flows between the employer and its pension scheme. Market fluctuations are
incidental to the main purpose of the pension scheme just as the revaluation gains
and losses on a fixed asset are incidental to its main operating role. They are
therefore best reported within the statement of total recognized gains and losses.
It is interesting that many felt that the move to full fair value accounting
had profound implications for financial statements for UK firms with DB
plans. The fact that sponsors could no longer smooth returns meant that
they (and their parent firms) now had to recognize the stochastic nature of
asset returns. Plan sponsors could no longer act as if returns and risks were
unrelated, or to put it another way, plan sponsors could no longer assume
that equities had a financial beta value of zero.
This result did not necessarily mean that the Board took a stance with
regard to pension portfolio choice. In other words, the fact that plan
sponsors had to acknowledge the existence of volatility was not evidence
that the Board’s sought to shift asset allocation patterns away from equities
and toward fixed-income securities. Nevertheless, critics of FRS 17 argued
that this regulation was responsible for causing (or at the very least provid-
ing incentives for) many firms to terminate their DB plans. They con-
tended that terminating the DB plans removed the volatility which had to
be reported by FRS 17. Empirical evidence on this point is, as yet, still
mixed. Klumpes et al. (2003) followed ninety UK firms of which thirty-
seven terminated their DB plans after switching from SSAP 24 to FRS 17;
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they found no support for the view that the change in the discount rate
mandated by the switch to FRS 17 was a statistically significant predictor of
plan termination. They did, however, find that firms which terminated
their DB plans were more likely to be highly leveraged. This tends to
suggest that firms which terminated their DB plans did so in part due to
the adverse impact of FRS 17 on their of the balance sheets.
The importance of the leverage issue may be a cautionary tale for
standard-setters and policymakers in other countries, inasmuch as it indi-
cates the issues in accounting reform when weak industries are involved.
For example, in the USA, an immediate shift to a complete fair market
value accounting regime could be problematic under today’s financial
market conditions. Firms with underfunded plans and/or highly leveraged
capital structures might quickly terminate their DB plans if forced to
undertake a rapid transition to a fair market value accounting; companies
might also fall in violation of their debt covenants. The problem, then, is
that in view of the poor funding status of many US plans, adoption of a FRS
17-style rule is probably not feasible in the near term. Over the longer term,
however, it is probably inevitable.
Implementation of FRS 17 in the UK and Ireland was delayed, in part, by
the desire of various stakeholders to make the change from old UK
accounting standards to the new international rules in 2005. As of 2001,
UK firms have had to disclose FRS 17 numbers in the notes to their
financial statements. While the Board urged all firms to switch to FRS 17,
it realized that firms would have to adopt IASB standards in 2005; conse-
quently the full implementation of FRS 17 was delayed to 2005. The IASB
Board’s project on pension accounting is in most respects convergent with
FRS 17.
Financial analysts in London welcomed the change to FRS 17, even if
implementation was partial at the outset. In a research study on UK
pension underfunding, Morgan Stanley (2003) noted that its analysis
could not have been done using SSAP 24 disclosures. Its analysis of a
group of fifty-seven UK firms revealed that the disclosures were strong
predictors of cash flow; that is, there was a positive relationship between
the pension plans’ service cost and contributions paid. Also it reported that
contributions were higher if a plan’s funding status was weaker. Overall, DB
underfunding for sample firms reduced shareholder equity by approxi-
mately 5 percent, with a wide dispersion. The variability was considerable
from year to year due to the very high equity allocations in UK plans.
Average equity allocations in UK plans were between 60 and 70 percent,
with some even higher. There is one famous exception worth noting,
however: after the new rule, the Boots pharmacy firm cut its DB pension
equity exposure to zero and shifted entirely into bonds. Interestingly, that
study found no relation between funding status and equity allocation, or
between equity allocation and the maturity status of the plan.
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The high average equity allocations in UK plans caused a dramatic
reversal of fortune in terms of aggregate funding status, when the equity
market began to fall sharply as of 2000. By the end of 2002, DB plan
underfunding was reported in the range of £160–300 billion (CBI 2003).
Fund managers and plan sponsors complained that they were prohibited
from building up a ‘rainy day’ reserve during the bull market of the 1990s
by the regulation that funds in excess of 105 percent were subject to
taxation at a rate of 35 percent (Blake 2003). This regulation was in force
during the era of SSAP 24, however, when the actuarial rules were suffi-
ciently loose that plan sponsors who wanted to save for a rainy day could
have done so if they were worried that the market was building into a
bubble and that things would eventually end badly. Instead, many plan
sponsors maintained high equity allocations and took extended contribu-
tion holidays during the 1990s. It is true, however, that an additional tax
regulation working to the detriment of full funding was the end to the right
to reclaim imputed taxes on dividend income. This exacerbated the fund-
ing problem at the same time that the present value of liabilities was being
forced dramatically up by the switch from SSAP 24 treatment to FRS 17
treatment, with further pressure on present values coming from the fall in
the yield curve.
The dramatic deterioration in UK pension funding levels, at the time
that more stringent FRS 17 standards came into effect (at least in the notes
to the statements), meant that DB plan sponsors faced immediate and in
many cases prolonged calls for additional plan contributions. Some
blamed this for the fact that, by year-end 2002, approximately half of all
UK DB plans had closed to new entrants while the remaining active mem-
bers continued to accrue benefits (Blake 2003). This does not mean that
new employees were denied pension coverage, since old plan closures
in many cases resulted in a substitution of new DC plans. Of course, the
shift to DC plans offers the advantage of portability and probably signals
that the UK will experience the same shift as has the USA for the last thirty
years.
Convergence in International Pension Accounting
All these changes also have implications for financial reporting by foreign
multinational firms, though the picture is still complex. For example, a
firm might need to adopt several different methods in accounting for its
pension obligations and when filing statements: it would have to use
national standards for its domestic reports, IAS standards for international
reports (e.g. on the London Stock Exchange), and FASB standards for US
listings. If the firm was a multinational insurer listing in the USA, it would
also have to meet SAP standards for statutory reporting in fifty states and
the District of Columbia. The problem is that multiple reporting can
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introduce inadvertent mistakes and increase costs, and also perhaps con-
fuse analysts.
To bring convergence to reality, the IASB and the FASB have recently
signed a memorandum on convergence committing them to convergence
in global accounting standards in as many areas as their respective boards
have judged feasible. One area in need of improvement is clearly pension
accounting, and the IASB Board added a project on convergence
on accounting for retirement benefits to its active agenda in June 2002. It
has made substantial progress since then, influenced heavily by FRS 17 but
also by the recent issuance of SFAS 132. It has incorporated certain of its
disclosure rules into the forthcoming exposure draft of the revised IAS 19,
and it appears that the revised IAS 19 will be a very large step in terms of
convergence (IAS 2004).
IAS 19 proposes to be based on a fair value accounting framework. Assets
in the plan will be valued using market prices wherever possible. Pension
plan liabilities will be discounted using high-grade corporate bonds. The
rules do not specify the exact grade or type of security, as in FRS 17, but the
intent of the standard is clearly convergence with both FRS 17 and SFAS 87.
Pension plan liabilities must be valued using the projected unit credit
method. In addition to the formal terms of the plan, indexation agree-
ments and future salary increases must be taken into account when valuing
liabilities. In addition, ‘constructive’ obligations must be taken into ac-
count. An example of a constructive obligation is a regular practice such
as regular annual wage and salary increases at a certain rate. This shows the
influence on IASB thinking of FRS 17 and also of other actors (such as
social partners in Europe) regarding the valuation of long-dated liabilities.
Under this framework, actuarial gains and losses must be recognized
immediately, outside the income statement, in a statement of total recog-
nized income and expenses, and they also must be included immediately in
retained earnings. Previously, the old standard had a 10 percent corridor
around the full funding level, and changes in surplus of that amount (in
absolute value) did not have to be reflected on the plan sponsor’s balance
sheet. In addition, actuarial gains and losses above or below this level could
be amortized over the working lives of employees, a view reflective of the
SFAS 87 approach. The new standard eliminates this corridor entirely as
well as the spreading and amortization approach to valuing actuarial gains
and losses, and it adopts the FRS 17 approach of recognizing them imme-
diately.
In terms of disclosures, convergence has also been achieved by requiring
disclosures adopted from SFAS 132, principally those concerned with how
plan sponsors and fund managers determine the expected return on DB
plan assets. Assets held by the plan must be disclosed according to their
major asset classes and as a percentage of the total fair value of the plan’s
assets. Of particular importance, the disclosure must include a description
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of the assumptions and logic used to determine the overall expected rate of
return on assets as well as the previously agreed disclosure of the expected
rate of return for each major asset class. Some elements of convergence did
not cross the Atlantic, however. In SFAS 132, the disclosure requirements
include a description of investment policies and strategies. As of this
writing, the IASB has only flagged this as a question for the exposure
draft, but no resolution is yet known.
In terms of contributions and benefits, the required disclosure is an
estimate of contributions, if any; the plan sponsor expects to pay into the
plan in the next fiscal year after the balance sheet date. In SFAS 132, the
disclosure requirements for benefits theplan sponsor expects to paymust be
listed by line item for the next five fiscal years, and in aggregate, for the five
fiscal years following. The IASB will resolve this difference in its final ruling.
Consistency with the Economics of Pension Finance
Pension accounting rules in the past can be, and have been, justly criticized
for divorcing real world assumptions about asset returns from their distri-
butions. This built in a bias, in terms of asset allocation, and for this reason,
accounting rules can be said to have had a systematic impact on economic
decision-making. The bias may, in fact, have been large enough to have
contributed to the US stock market bubble in a significant way (Coronado
and Sharpe 2003). Further, when the bubble burst, DB pension plan
overexposure to equities exacerbated the shock sustained by plan portfo-
lios. If plan portfolios had been properly immunized at the onset of the
market decline, the damage sustained and the subsequent degree of under-
funding would have been much less.
The new accounting rules are an attempt to rectify perceived problems
caused by past smoothing, and they are part of a larger international
movement toward fair value accounting standards. Proponents of the new
standards believe that moving to the more transparent world of fair value
accounting, and away from actuarial smoothing of gains and losses, will
prevent periodic funding crises by highlighting small problems before they
can grow into large problems. Opponents of the new standards argue,
conversely, that introducing fair value accounting into a system of long-
dated commitments introduces excessive volatility for too little benefit.
They point to the large-scale closure of DB plans to new entrants in the
UK as vindication of their position. They further argue that this is a case
where accounting rules not only drive decision-making but also affect the
lives of active employees.
In the USA, with many underfunded plans and financial distress in
several sectors of the economy, an immediate move to fair value accounting
standards would have serious consequences. Among them would probably
be violations of debt covenants, immediate plan terminations, closures of
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plans to new entrants, and removal or sharp reductions in retiree health
insurance coverage. Yet a case can be made that a true reading of the
financial situation of troubled firms would indicate that they are already
in violation of their debt covenants; many probably plan to terminate their
plans in the near future anyway. Congress and the Administration are
attempting to craft legislative transition rules to buy time until plan spon-
sors can restore full funding levels. It is unclear whether they this will be
more successful with this strategy than similar efforts were with regard to
the savings and loan industry in the 1980s.
Our discussion also raises questions about proper investment strategies
for DB plans. Most DB accrual plans have some form of final salary formula
as the arrangement of choice. In addition, annuitants generally can be
assumed to be married at the time of retirement, with joint and survivor
annuities the default, so that the receipt of income will be statistically
longer than for a single life annuity. This means that plan sponsors and
asset managers must design an immunization strategy matched against
nominal wage growth and employee demographics during employees’
active years, and against the terms of the two-life annuities during the
payout years. In addition, the immunization strategy must account for the
pension rights of those who have separated from employment but are
vested and will eventually receive annuities.
Concerning the first part of the immunization problem, no sovereign or
high-grade private entity currently issues securities with coupons and ma-
turities that match expected wage trajectories of employees in a corporate
or public sector DB plan. This is especially true for younger employees, who
are most likely to leave the plan. Inflation-indexed government bonds are
the asset class that comes the closest, but if this asset were to constitute the
entire portfolio it would in turn imply high contribution rates and lower
earnings for the plan sponsor.
This is an important point that reformers should take seriously. Calling
for sharply increased contributions by the plan sponsor could backfire on
the very people the reform is intended to benefit. If plan sponsors or
Boards of Directors decide that the cost of fully funding and immunizing
a DB plan with inflation-linked bonds is too high, they could decide to
terminate the plan altogether.
Conclusions
This volume focuses on the trend toward international convergence in
pension accounting. We devote special emphasis to recent changes in UK
accounting standards since that country’s rule-setting Board is acting as the
model for global changes. In addition, we ask whether some of the recent
accounting changes may result in changes in DB plan design and asset
management.
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We show that standard-setters are moving toward international conver-
gence, and it seemsclear that this trendwill continue.On thewhole,weargue
that the new accounting paradigm is an improvement over the old account-
ing paradigm, with its emphasis on smoothing and its decoupling of risks
from returns. Opponents of fair value standards have argued that switching
to these will import introduce excessive volatility to financial statements for
little or no benefit to users and issuers of statements. These arguments
continue, yet the standards are set for adoption in Europe from 2005.
In the USA, the DB funding situation is far from positive: even with a
reasonably good economy, it will be some time before the system as a whole
is restored to full solvency. Immediate application of a fair value framework
would run the risk of massive DB plan terminations, yet improved disclos-
ure rules will aid users of financial statements, and they in turn will make
their voices heard concerning the quality of information disclosed.
Convergence will probably change the way DB plan investments are
managed. Fixed-income investment strategies will probably pay more atten-
tion to immunization and duration than was the case previously. In the USA
where so many DB plans have relatively old demographic structures, plan
sponsors and investment managers may concentrate more on investment
strategies attuned to the timing of retirement benefit cash flows. An argu-
ment can be made that the old accounting conventions encouraged DB
plan sponsors and fund managers to invest too much in equity. But simi-
larly, some will claim that the new standards will encourage too much fixed
income in pension fund portfolios. Ultimately, accounting rules work best
when they are neutral with respect to economic decision-making, when they
acknowledge that returns are coupled with risks of a long-term nature.
Endnotes
1. For a discussion of pension funding terminology see McGill et al. (2004).
2. The fact that some DB formulas were backloaded explains some of the contro-
versy over some firms’ switch from a traditional DB to a cash balance or hybrid
plan (Schieber 2003).
3. We note that public sector plan practice often differs; cf. Anderson and Brainard
(Chapter 12).
4. Whether the switch to fair value accounting may change corporate economic
decision making has been raised recently in the context of accounting for life
insurance (Fore 2003).
5. Of course, if the promise is a joint and survivor annuity, as is typically the case,
then this adds several more years to the payment promise.
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